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[redacted]

COMOR-D-47/3

D R A F T

19 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Intelligence Requirements for Aerial Photo Reconnaissance Relevant to the Current and Impending International Situation 25X1

1. The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance has recently reviewed the critical needs of United States intelligence which should be satisfied in order to provide the intelligence support for anticipated policy decisions which will face the United States Government during the current international crisis.

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2. The COMOR [redacted] recommends that U-2 photography be obtained on certain highest priority targets (See Attachment A). The COMOR has recognized in making its recommendation for overflight at this time that it is a matter of grave risk and has accordingly looked most critically at the targets which it recommends and the justification which it submits.

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NGA Review Completed.

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3. The COMOR has also taken into account the needs of policymakers for intelligence which will be directly related to the

25X1 Berlin situation. [redacted]

These targets relate to the following assumptions and the intelligence needs confronting us under the assumed conditions:

a. Assuming no near-term settlement of the Berlin crisis, our knowledge of the military situation in East Germany needs to be completed and brought up to date.

b. In the event that access to Berlin is closed to the Allies, it is essential to determine the status of Soviet and satellite forces adjacent to Berlin, elsewhere in East Germany, and possibly in certain European satellite countries. Effective determination of the status of these forces would probably require periodic overflights.

c. Depending on the course of the Berlin crisis after access routes are closed, periodic coverage may be required of those targets capable of attacking Allied Forces in Europe as well as those capable of attacking the U. S. [redacted] 25X1

James Q. Reber
Chairman
Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance

Attachment: Justifications for U-2 Operations Against USSR
Copy 2--State TCO 6--ONI TCO
3--OSD 7, 8, 9--AFCIN TCO
4--JCS TCO 10, 11--NSA TCO
5--CIA TCO

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Justifications for U-2 Operations Against USSR

1. Policymakers of the United States Government will require the firmest possible knowledge of the Soviet military power

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position during the critical period of international tension.

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It is recommended that U-2 photography be obtained of certain highest priority targets at the earliest feasible opportunity to answer these questions.

2. ICBM: The most important intelligence problem is that of the operational deployment of the ICBM. We believe that the Soviet Union can now fire operationally against targets in the United States only its first generation ICBM.

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3. Also through satellite photography we have established the existence of sites at [redacted] which appear to be designed for the deployment of a second generation Soviet ICBM. The photography, however, is not adequate to establish whether or not these sites might be adaptable for use by the first generation missile. We are left in the position of not having established firmly the existence of any operational launch site for the only Soviet ICBM we believe to be ready for operational use against the United States at this time. Therefore, it is recommended that priority targets on this question of operational deployment of the ICBM be [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted] in that order. It should be noted also that coverage of the latter two sites would undoubtedly provide valuable information on the operational status of the new second generation missile system as well as technical details on the system itself.

4. There are other locations which we suspect for ICBM deployment. However, the evidence on which our suspicion is based is insufficient to warrant the employment of the U-2 at this time.

5. MRBM and IRBM: We have identified [redacted] individual launchers for MRBM or IRBM, though we cannot distinguish from the photography whether these launchers are for 700, 1100, or 2,000 mile range. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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6. We have proposed a selection of each type of launcher from four geographic areas from which CORONA Operations could select, depending upon operational feasibility. (N.B. Members are requested to propose these items.)

7. Anti-Ballistic Missiles: We cannot obtain from present or immediately prospective satellite photography the answers to detailed technical questions concerning the nature and expected operational date of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile program. We have examined whether photography of the quality of the U-2 will provide the answers to our technical questions and are persuaded that this is so. Such information, we anticipate, will likely be highly critical in regard to policy questions within the year. Although on the basis of our present evidence, it is not likely that the Soviet Union will have an operational anti-ballistic missile system within the immediate

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future, the approximate date by which they acquire such an operatinnal system would likely have an important bearing on the relative strategic power of the U. S. and the Soviet Union. The planning of our courses of action during the next year might be strongly affected by the date at which we expect the Soviet Union to acquire an operational anti-ballistic missile system. Our priority targets [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

[redacted] 25X1

9. Submarine: The technical characteristics, size, and operational readiness of the Soviet submarine launched missile forces will have an important bearing on the military power position of the Soviet Union during the forthcoming crisis. These submarine forces pose a serious threat to the continental U. S. and its allies. Available intelligence confirms the existence of Soviet guided missile, ballistic missile, and nuclear powered submarines. U-2 photography of bases

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where these forces are known to be deployed could give us photography which would provide the detailed information on the technical characteristics. It would also establish the number of such submarines in port at that time. [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] In the northern sector, a flight along the Kola Peninsula facing the Barents Sea could provide such answers on that portion of the Soviet submarine fleet. The situation in the Far East is of quite a different order of difficulty because we would have to cover four ports, namely, Petropavlovsk, Sovetskaya Gavan, Vladivostok, and Vladimir, only the latter two being proximate to one another. High resolution photography can provide the characteristics from which offensive capability may be estimated.

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11. A number of new Soviet fighters and bombers were displayed at the recent air show in Moscow. Targets would almost certainly provide photography of some of the key airfields at which these planes might be deployed. Photography of these would aid in determining whether or not these planes are being produced in sufficient number to indicate an operational role.

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

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